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In random–lottery incentive experiments, the choices of certain outcomes are 
stimulated by uncertain lotteries.  This “certain–uncertain” inconsistency is 
evident, but only recently emphasized.  Because of it, conclusions from a 
random–lottery incentive experiment that includes a certain outcome cannot be 
unquestionably correct.  Well-known experimental results and purely 
mathematical theorems support this.  The main result presented here is:  The 
usual experimental systems of utility and prospect theories may need additional 
independent analyses in the context of the “certain–uncertain” inconsistency.  
 
Contents 
 
Introduction …………………………………………………….  2 
 
1. An analysis of a detail of the experiments …………………….   2 
1.1. Random incentives  
1.2. Random incentives and certain outcomes  
1.3. An inconsistency between the certain outcomes  
and uncertain incentives 
1.4. The role of the incentives  
2. The “certain–uncertain” inconsistency  
of the random–lottery incentive system ………………………  4 
2.1. The random–lottery incentive system  
2.2. The “certain–uncertain” inconsistency of the system  
3. Purely mathematical support  
of the possibility of existence of  the inconsistency ……………  5 
4. Experimental evidence of the inconsistency ……………………  6 
4.1. Conditions 
4.2. Results 
4.3. Deductions 
5. Possible consequences  
of the “certain–uncertain” inconsistency ………………………  7 
 
Conclusions ……………………………………………………….  8 
References ………………………………………………………..  9 
2 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The present short article considers a potential problem of the usual incentive 
system of experiments in utility and prospect theories. The problem is an 
inconsistency in the stimulation of certain (sure) outcomes by uncertain lotteries.   
The purpose of the article is to investigate the inconsistency. This purpose is 
new, so, in the first stages of its study, the general methods of the present research 
are mainly qualitative.  
There are a number of theories concerned with one or another concept of 
utility.  They include, e.g., Bernoullian expected utility, von Neumann–Morgenstern 
expected utility, subjective expected utility, subjectively weighted utility theories 
(see, e.g., a review by Schoemaker, 1982); prospect theory (see Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979) and cumulative prospect theory (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) 
or, in other terminology, original prospect theory and prospect theory; the salience 
theory of choice under risk (see Bordalo, Gennaioli, Shleifer, 2012); etc. 
Here these theories are referred to as utility and prospect theories.  
The article develops the report Harin (2014).  
The need for considering the subject of the article is grounded on the 
prevalence and usefulness of the random–lottery incentive systems of experiments 
and on the importance of the zone  p ~ 1.   
 
 
1. An analysis of a detail of the experiments 
1.1. Random incentives  
 
Let us analyze one usual feature of experiments in utility and prospect 
theories. Let us consider some typical descriptions of the utility experiments. One 
can see in the literature (the boldface is my own):  
Loewenstein and Thaler (1989), page 188: “The students … were told that the 
experimenter would select and implement one of their choices at random.” 
Baltussen et al. (2012), page 424: “In the WRIS treatment, subjects play the 
game ten times, one of which for real payment. In the BRIS treatment, subjects 
play the game only once with a one-in-ten chance of real payment.”  and page 425: 
“In both RIS treatments, a ten-sided die was thrown individually by each subject to 
determine her payment.”  
Other sources such as Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1991), Vossler, Doyon 
and Rondeau (2012), etc. give similar descriptions.  
Such a procedure can be seen not only in the utility and prospect theories but 
also in other fields of the economics, see, e.g., Larkin and Leider (2012), page 193: 
“Subjects made fifteen choices between a lottery and a fixed payment. … Subjects 
were paid for one randomly selected decision.”  
So, subjects are stimulated by random incentives. This is a well-known feature 
of the experiments, including in the field of utility and prospect theories. 
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1.2. Random incentives and certain outcomes 
 
Let us consider this feature more closely. One can see a detail in the literature 
(the boldface and underlining is my own):  
Starmer and Sugden (1991), page 974: “subjects in groups B and C knew that 
they were taking part in a random–lottery experiment in which questions 21 and 22 
had equal chances of being for real.” and “One problem, which we shall call P', 
required a choice between two lotteries R' (for "riskier") and S' (for “safer”). R' 
gave a 0.2 chance of winning ₤10.00 and a 0.75 chance of winning ₤7.00 (with the 
residual 0.05 chance of winning nothing); S' gave ₤7.00 for sure.” 
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012), page 3365: “One choice for each subject was 
selected for payment by drawing a numbered card at random. Subjects were told to 
treat each decision as if it were to determine their payments.” and page 3366: 
“Section I provided a testable hypothesis for behavior across certain and uncertain 
intertemporal settings.” 
Other sources such as Holt and Laury (2002), Harrison et al. (2005), 
Abdellaoui et al. (2011), etc. give the same detail.  
So, the random incentive procedures are used not only in the uncertain but in 
the certain situations too. Let us consider this detail more closely.  
 
 
1.3. An inconsistency between the certain outcomes  
and uncertain incentives  
 
So, a well-known feature of the experiments, including in the field of utility 
and prospect theories, is that subjects are stimulated by random incentives.  
First, let us note that the stimulation (incentive) by a random payment selected 
from two or more alternatives may be called a random, uncertain stimulation. One 
may refer to it also as a stimulation by an uncertain incentive.  
Further, let us consider a stimulation by this uncertain incentive separately for 
uncertain and certain choices. 
Suppose, that subjects choose an uncertain choice, that is, a choice whose 
probability is strictly less than  1  (and strictly more than  0).  In this case, the 
choice and the incentive are of the same type.  
Suppose, that the subjects choose a certain choice, that is, a choice whose 
probability is strictly equal to  1.  In this case, the choice and the incentive are of the 
essentially different types.  The choice is certain but the incentive is uncertain.  
Moreover, one should emphasize:  this uncertain incentive can call into 
question the certain outcome.  
Therefore, there is an evident inconsistency between the certain type of the 
choice and the uncertain type of the incentive.  
Therefore, the correctness of the use of uncertain incentives for certain 
outcomes cannot be unquestionable. One may call this problem the “certain–
uncertain” inconsistency.  
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This inconsistency is evident but the author of this article has found no 
mention about it in the literature: see, e.g., Andreoni and Sprenger (2012); Vossler, 
Doyon and Rondeau (2012); Baltussen et al. (2012); see also all issues of RePEc's 
“New Economics Papers. Utility Models & Prospect Theory” at  
http://econpapers.repec.org/scripts/nep.pf?list=nepupt  for the period 2005–2015. 
The inconsistency was revealed in the report Harin (2014). The present article 
develops this report. 
 
 
1.4. The role of the incentives 
 
Incentives have been widely discussed in economics (see, e.g., Starmer and 
Sugden, 1991; Fehr and Falk, 2002; Holt and Laury, 2002; Baltussen et al., 2012: 
Larkin and Leider, 2012). Do incentives influence the choices made by the subjects 
in utility and prospect theories?  
The correct answer to this question needs a special investigation. However, 
one may be sure that if incentives did not have any influence on the choices made 
by the subjects, then there would be no reason to use such incentives.  
Therefore, one may not exclude that an incentive can influence the choice 
made by a subject, at least partially.  
Therefore, one may not exclude that an uncertain incentive can call into 
question the certain outcome, at least partially.  
 
 
2. The “certain–uncertain” inconsistency 
of the random–lottery incentive system 
2.1. The random–lottery incentive system 
 
The above discussed random incentive procedure is usually referred to as the 
random–lottery incentive system (or the random lottery incentive system or random 
incentive system (RIS), etc.).  
The random–lottery incentive system is a widely used experimental procedure 
employed in the utility and prospect theories (see, e.g., Starmer and Sugden, 1991, 
Starmer, 2000, Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012, Baltussen et al., 2012, etc.).   
For example, Starmer (2000), page 371: “… the most common reward 
mechanism is the random lottery incentive system.” 
Moreover, we can see in Baltussen et al. (2012), page 419: “If a subject 
performs multiple tasks in an experiment where each task is for real, then income 
and portfolio effects will arise … The RIS is the only incentive system known today 
that can avoid such effects. In addition, for a given research budget and with the 
face values of the monetary amounts kept the same, RISs allow for a larger number 
of observations.” 
So, the random–lottery incentive system is, at least, the usual experimental 
system (procedure) employed in the utility and prospect theories.  
 
 
5 
 
 
2.2. The “certain–uncertain” inconsistency of the system 
 
In many works (see, e.g., Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012; Vossler, Doyon and 
Rondeau, 2012; Baltussen et al., 2012, Vrijdags and Marchant, 2015) one can find 
the elaborated investigations of the correctness of the random–lottery incentive 
system. The author of this article has found, however, no mention of the “certain–
uncertain” inconsistency or similar questions. 
So, one may conclude:  
• The random–lottery incentive system is widespread in the utility and 
prospect theories. There are no wide discussion about differences between 
the results of the random–lottery incentive system and other systems.  
• The essence of the random–lottery incentive system corresponds to the 
random, uncertain name of the system.  
• The considered specific “certain–uncertain” inconsistency of the 
random–lottery incentive system has not yet been mentioned in the literature.  
So, the random–lottery incentive system is concerned with the “certain–
uncertain” inconsistency. This inconsistency means that the certain choice is 
stimulated by the uncertain incentive. Because of this evident “certain–uncertain” 
inconsistency, the deductions from a random–lottery incentive experiment, that 
includes a certain outcome, cannot be unquestionably correct.  
So, such deductions need an additional proof or an amendment, or a new 
approach. 
 
 
3.  Purely mathematical support of the possibility  
of existence of  the inconsistency 
 
Kahneman and Thaler (2006) pointed out that the basic problems of utility and 
prospect theories have not yet been adequately solved. 
One possible way to solve these problems is widely discussed, e.g., in 
Schoemaker and Hershey (1992), Chay et al (2005), Butler and Loomes (2007).  
The essence of this way consists in a proper attention to noise, uncertainty, 
imprecision, etc.   
Another possible way to solve these problems is to consider the vicinities of 
the borders of the probability scale, e.g. at  p~1.  Steingrimsson and Luce (2007) 
and Aczél and Luce (2007) emphasized a fundamental question:  whether Prelec’s 
weighting function (see Prelec, 1998)  is equal to  1  at  p=1.   
In any case, one may suppose that a synthesis of the above two ways can be of 
interest.  
Purely mathematical theorems (see, e.g., Harin, 2012) were proved indeed for 
the mean and probability near the borders of intervals. The theorems state, in 
particular, that, in the presence of a non-zero dispersion of data (e.g., due to noise), 
the probability cannot attain  p=1.  It follows from the theorems that the “certain–
uncertain” inconsistency is at least not excluded. 
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4. Experimental evidence 
of the “certain–uncertain” inconsistency 
4.1.  Conditions 
 
One can see the following in the description of the well-known experiment of 
Starmer and Sugden (1991):  
Page 974: “For groups A and D, this page began with an underlined text 
stating that question 22 would be played for real. For groups B and C, the 
corresponding text stated that one of the two questions would be played for real and 
that which question was to played out would be decided at the end of the 
experiment in the following way. The subject would roll a six-sided die. If the 
number on the die was 1, 2, or 3, then question 21 would be played; if the number 
was 4, 5, or 6, question 22 would be played. 
… 
One problem, which we shall call P', required a choice between two lotteries 
R' (for "riskier") and S' (for "safer"). R' gave a 0.2 chance of winning ₤10.00 and a 
0.75 chance of winning ₤7.00 (with the residual 0.05 chance of winning nothing); S' 
gave ₤7.00 for sure.” 
 
 
4.2.  Results 
 
So, in the R'-S' problem, R' gives  ₤10.00×0.2+₤7.00×0.75 = ₤7.25.  S' gives  
₤7.00×1 = ₤7.00.  Here  R' = ₤7.25>S' = ₤7.00.   
Let us consider the results from table 2 on Page 976, those are of interest here 
(the boldface is my own): 
• Group = B, Incentive = Random lottery, R':S' = 19:21 
• Group = C, Incentive = Random lottery, R':S' = 22:18 
• Group = D, Incentive = P' real,  R':S' = 13:27 
So, the results for P' real incentive  (13:27)  differ evidently and essentially 
from the results for random lottery incentive  (19:21  and  22:18).  
Let us evaluate the percentage of the subjects choosing the uncertain outcome 
and the direction of the modification of  W(p).  The total number of the subjects in 
each group is equal to  40=19+21=22+18=13+27.  So, the percentage is equal to  
19/40~48%,  22/40=55%  and  13/40~33%.  One may see that the modification of  
W(p)  by the random lottery incentives is directed from  13/40~33%  to  19/40~48%  
and 22/40=55%.  That is it is directed from  0  to  1.   
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4.3.  Deductions 
 
The modification of  W(p)  by the “certain–uncertain” inconsistency:   
One can easily see the experiment shows that the random lottery incentives 
can essentially modify subjects’ choices in comparison with the real incentives, 
when these choices include certain outcomes and the probability  (p = 0.2 + 0.75 = 
0.95 ~ 1)  of the uncertain choices is near the border of the probability scale.  
The direction of the modification of  W(p):   
The modification of  W(p)  by the random lottery incentives is directed from  0  
to  1.   
Therefore, the real unbiased probability weighting function  W(p),  at  p ~ 1,  
is located farther from  1  and nearer to  0  than the function biased by the random 
lottery incentives. 
 
 
5.  Possible consequences of the “certain–uncertain” inconsistency 
 
One can specify a value  WCertain  of the probability weighting function  W(p)  
for the certain outcome.  WCertain  may be evidently assumed to be equal to  1.  One 
can also specify a value  W(1)  as the limit of the probability weighting function  
W(p)  for the probable outcome when the probability  p  tends to  1.  If  
CertainWW ≠)1(    
then the probability weighting function  W(p)  is discontinuous at  p = 1.   
Due to the experiment, the real unbiased probability weighting function  W(p)  
is located farther from  1  (at  p ~ 1) than the function biased by the random lottery 
incentives. Therefore a question can also arise whether the uncertain incentives can 
hide a possible discontinuity of  W(p)  at  p = 1.  
Therefore the experiment of Starmer and Sugden (1991) and the purely 
mathematical theorems (see, e.g., Harin, 2012) support the feasibility of a possible 
discontinuity of  W(p)  at the probability  p = 1.   
Note, a discontinuity and jumps has been already discussed in utility and 
prospect theories (see, e.g., Masson, 1974, Delbaen, F., S. Drapeau, and M. Kupper 
2011.   
A discontinuity is not a quantitative but a qualitative, moreover, a topological 
feature.  So, it can qualitatively change the situation in the utility and prospect 
theories, at least in their mathematical aspects. 
It may be supposed that such basic and useful tools as the random incentive 
systems, the overwhelming majority of the data already obtained by means of them, 
and the deductions from the data may and should continue to be used.   
Apparently, the farther from  p = 1  the less relevant is a possible 
discontinuity at  p = 1  and the smaller can be corrections of the data and 
deductions. Note, that the experiments (see, e.g., Cubitt, Starmer and Sugden, 1998; 
Beattie and Loomes, 1997) at the probabilities that are less than  0.9  are not so 
informative and not so sensitive to the “certain–uncertain” inconsistency as that of 
Starmer and Sugden (1991). 
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The following may be supposed:   
In the narrow middle of the probability scale (where the probability weighting 
function intercepts the line  W(p) = p)  and in the obvious cases, the data and 
deductions may be used “as is”.  This may be true also for the cases those do not 
include certain (sure) outcomes. 
In the wide middle of the probability scale, the deductions may be the same or 
slightly corrected.  This may be true when the probability  p  is located sufficiently 
far from  p = 1-rmean,  where the restriction  rmean  on the mean and on the 
probability is obtained from the theorems of existence of restrictions on the mean 
and on the probability (see, e.g., Harin, 2012). 
When the probability tends to the restriction  p1-rmean,  the data should be 
used with non-linear corrections and the deductions should be recalculated by non-
linear functions.   
At the probabilities that are in the forbidden zone  1-rmean≤p≤1,  a new 
approach may be needed to make the deductions correct.   
At first, the simplest possible and very rough correction might be straight-line 
approximations of the middle (roughly straight) parts of the already existing 
experimental data curves from the middle to the borders. At that, these straight-line 
approximations will pass lower than the point  W(p) = 1.  
The further consideration of the idea of the “certain-uncertain” inconsistency 
may be developed only after its independent confirmations will take place.   
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The usual experimental procedure in utility and prospect theories is the 
random–lottery incentive system (see, e.g., Starmer, 2000 and Baltussen et al., 
2012; etc.). 
The present short article emphasizes that in the random–lottery incentive 
system, the choices of certain (sure) outcomes are stimulated by uncertain lotteries.  
This inconsistency is quite evident but has not yet been mentioned in the 
literature (see, e.g., Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012; Vossler, Doyon and Rondeau, 
2012; Baltussen et al., 2012, Vrijdags and Marchant, 2015). The inconsistency was 
detected in the recent report Harin (2014). The present article develops this report.  
Because of this “certain–uncertain” inconsistency, the deductions from a 
random–lottery incentive experiment that includes a certain outcome cannot be 
unquestionably correct, especially at  p ~ 1.   
The well-known experiment of Starmer and Sugden (1991) and purely 
mathematical theorems (see, e.g., Harin, 2012) evidently support the possibility of 
the existence of this inconsistency.   
So, the main result of this article is that the usual experimental systems of the 
utility and prospect theories may need additional independent analyses and/or 
investigations in the context of the “certain–uncertain” inconsistency. 
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